I. Phenomenology (P) follows a peculiar zig-zag or circular methodology and continually will come back to its beginning:
1. Results will often have an impact on the methodology
2. P always starts ‘anew,’ though it will bring its accumulated skills and insights into play (don’t despair at starting over and over again, it’s a virtue)
3. It seems a vicious circle, but is not. It depends on the where and how of entering the circle (keep trying and trying and reflect on it)
4. All basic concepts hang-together: bracketing, intentionality, correlation, constitution, reflection, intuition, essence, ontology, to name a few.

II. 101 Phenomenology is all about the structure of intentionality (See separate hand-out)
1. Its myriad differentiations in ever more subtle dynamics and sub-structures
   a. Consciousness is always consciousness OF ...
   b. Correlation of intended object as intended and the how of its intention (Noema-Noesis or Intentio-Intentum structure)
   c. The dynamic of empty intending to fulfilled intuiting to relative identity (see separate hand-out: "Structure of Intentionality")
2. The ontological status of this structure
   a. The psychic (Brentano)
   b. Reason (early Husserl)
   c. One’s life-world (Later Husserl)
   d. Spirit (Scheler)
   e. Experience, Dasein (Heidegger)

III. Phenomenology (P)

Meaning of terms in bold to be taken provisionally, for their more precise phenomenological meaning will become clearer later. If you pre-judge too fast, you’ll miss it, though you necessarily have to pre-judge, but continually adapt your provisional hunches through Q & A’s and trial & error.

1. Not unlike a conversion, paradigm shift or gestalt switch:
   a. From a mundane notion of the sophisticated to a sophisticated notion of the mundane. (Only really understandable after the change)
   b. Shift from the natural attitude into the philosophical attitude
   c. Transcendence from the daily into the authentic mode
2. Peculiar difficulty:
   a. As any discourse it is circular
   b. Understanding the basic concepts based on understanding the whole
   c. But only the sequential use of the basic concepts will get you to the whole
d. Not a vicious circle to be overcome, but a question of how to enter the circle

3. What: P investigates the **structure and dynamics of experience/consciousness**:
   a. Validity of logic: **how and why** is it experienced as necessary?
   b. Perception: what **comes into play** when we perceive through our senses?
   c. Language: what are its **possibility conditions**?
   d. Any experience whatsoever in its **essential aspects**, including the sacred

4. How: P based on a peculiar refined kind of **reflection, intuition** and **abstraction**.
   a. **Reflection**
      i. Is **always already** available and operational in our mundane life: How am I doing? Why did I make this mistake? Who am I?
      ii. **Consciousness** bending backwards upon itself by holding the **just past** or a **memory** within the **spacious now**
      iii. P executes **reflection** in a more refined, self-conscious, methodological and structured way
   b. **Intuition**
      iv. Is **always already** available and operational in our mundane life: we experience and see life as already **qualified, differentiated, patterned**, and **signified**: scratched car, parts of a chair, house a > house b, row, melody, cup **for** drinking, house **for** shelter
      v. It is an **implicit, tacit** seeing not (yet) necessarily verbalized
      vi. P executes **intuition** in its particular way of looking at the experience(s) reflected upon and sees its structures and dynamics
   c. **Abstraction**
      vii. Is **always already** available and operational in our mundane life: we judge, compare, abstract, generalize, etc.
      viii. It is the seeing of commonalities, generalizations, essential attributes, etc. based on, and consequently seen in, particular instances
      ix. P executes **abstraction** in a more refined, methodological way by **intuiting** the **essential structures** of certain reflected upon experiences and does so through **eidetic reduction** (See hand-out on flow chart)

IV. But, before any of these operations are undertaken and refined, P calls for the operation of the **Epoché**: the ‘bracketing,’ suspension, **putting out of play** of our daily or usual sense of being or **ontology**. What is ontology?

**Ontology**: a **doctrine of being** which gives a framework of interpretation with profound and far-reaching consequences for the way we see 1) the **universe**, 2) **ourselves** and 3) the way we think how we obtain **knowledge** about both. Most ontologies are **derived** from our understanding of **non-human** beings/things/products that we are familiar with:

1. Aristotle: the **universe** is one great **living organism of forming matter** (recently revived by Rupert Sheldrake in his thesis of **morphic resonance** within a **morphogenetic field**)
2. Descartes: one giant **mechanical clockwork**
3. Leibniz: **Conglomeration of Monads** that reflect in different ways the rest of the **universe** (recently revived by the scientific understanding of **holographic** photography. See David Bohm’s thought on the **holographic universe** and mind)
4. Newton: giant causal system of **interacting gravitating corpuscular entities**
5. Computer-age: the **universe** and the mind as one **data-processing machine**
All these ontologies are inadequate to understand the human being. And psychology and theology will not do either, because those are also profoundly affected/infected with 'alien' ontological notions.

Phenomenology tries to arrive at an understanding of the "issue itself" without help of imported concepts from realms that are different from the human. The two big philosophers blazing the trail in this direction were Edmund Husserl and his erstwhile student Martin Heidegger.

These ontologies, which are in fact pre-judgments, therefore have to be suspended, bracketed, or more violently, destroyed, in order to open up the possibility for a more adequate, originary interpretation of our own being and its experiences.

V. The how of phenomenological research: See separate hand-out of “Flow Chart of Eidetic Analysis” (Derived from Do It Yourself Phenomenology by Theodore Kisiel)

VI. The experience of the Sacred in phenomenological context: See separate “Flow Chart of the Eidetic Analysis of the Experience of the Sacred”

Addenda (from “What is Phenomenology?” By Lester Embree):

VII. Seven Widely Accepted Features of the Phenomenological Approach.

1. Phenomenologists tend to oppose the acceptance of unobservable matters and grand systems erected in speculative thinking

2. Phenomenologists tend to oppose naturalism (also called objectivism and positivism), which is the worldview growing from modern natural science and technology that has been spreading from Northern Europe since the Renaissance;

3. Positively speaking, phenomenologists tend to justify cognition (and some also evaluation and action) with reference to what Edmund Husserl called Evidenz, which is awareness of a matter itself as disclosed in the most clear, distinct, and adequate way for something of its kind;

4. Phenomenologists tend to believe that not only objects in the natural and cultural worlds, but also ideal objects, such as numbers, and even conscious life itself can be made evident and thus known;

5. Phenomenologists tend to hold that inquiry ought to focus upon what might be called "encountering" as it is directed at objects and, correlatively, upon "objects as they are encountered" (this terminology is not widely shared, but the emphasis on a dual problematics and the reflective approach it requires is);

6. Phenomenologists tend to recognize the role of description in universal, a priori, or "eidetic" terms as prior to explanation by means of causes, purposes, or grounds; and
7. Phenomenologists tend to debate whether or not Husserl calls the transcendental phenomenological epoché and reduction is useful or even possible.

VIII. Four successively dominant and sometimes overlapping philosophical tendencies and stages can be recognized in the phenomenological movement. [Case could be made for a 5th tendency: ‘the religious turn,” for which Heidegger laid the basics in the 1920s with his seminar on “Phenomenology of the Religious Life”]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phenomenology</th>
<th>Founder &amp; pupils</th>
<th>Major works</th>
<th>Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. Descriptive</td>
<td>Husserl</td>
<td><em>Logical Investigations</em> (1901)</td>
<td>logic, mathematics, language, perception, expectation, imagination, memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Realistic</td>
<td>Husserl, Reinach, Scheler, Stein</td>
<td><em>Logical Investigations</em> (1901)</td>
<td>human actions, motives, selves, law, ethics, value theory, religion, gender, aesthetics, architecture, music, literature, film</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Constitutive</td>
<td>Husserl, Gurwitsch, Mohanty, Sokolowski</td>
<td><em>Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology</em> (1913)</td>
<td>All of the above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Existential</td>
<td>Heidegger, Arendt, Sartre, Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty</td>
<td><em>Being and Time</em> (1927); <em>Being and Nothingness</em> (1943)</td>
<td>action, conflict, desire, finitude, oppression, death, ethnicity, political theory, gender, old age, perception, the lived body, freedom, literature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(0) The phenomenological movement began with Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900-1901). This work is most famous for its attack on psychologism, which is the attempt to absorb logic into empirical psychology. Besides logic, this work reflects interest in mathematics, language, perception, and various types of re-presentation (e.g., expectation, imagination, and memory), and also describes how ideal objects might be made evident and known.

Because of its reflective, evidential, and descriptive approach to both encountering and objects as encountered, the beginning of phenomenology is sometimes characterized as If this is the trunk, there is then a succession of four large limbs that branch out from it:

(1) **Realistic phenomenology** emphasizes the search for the universal essences of various sorts of matters, including human actions, motives, and selves. Within this tendency, Adolf Reinach added philosophy of law to the phenomenological agenda; Max Scheler added ethics, value theory, religion, and philosophical anthropology; Edith Stein added philosophy of the human
sciences and has been recently recognized for work on gender; and Roman Ingarden added aesthetics, architecture, music, literature, and film.

(2) **Constitutive phenomenology.** This procedure involves suspending acceptance of the pregiven status of conscious life as something that exists in the world and is performed in order to secure an ultimate intersubjective grounding for the world and the positive sciences of it. Use of this method places constitutive phenomenology in the modern tradition that goes back at least to Kant, and also characterizes the rest of Husserl's work.

(3) **Existential phenomenology** is often traced back to Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* of 1927, the project of which was actually to use an analysis of human being as a means to a fundamental ontology that went beyond the regional ontologies described by Husserl. This third tendency is concerned with topics such as action, conflict, desire, finitude, oppression, and death. Arendt contributed to political theory and the problematics of ethnicity, Beauvoir raised the issue of gender and old age, Merleau-Ponty creatively continued the appropriation of Gestalt psychology in his descriptions of perception and the lived body, and Sartre focused on freedom and literature.

(4) **Hermeneutical phenomenology** chiefly stems from the method set forth in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, according to which human existence is interpretative. The issues addressed in hermeneutical phenomenology include simply all of those that were added to the agenda in the previous tendencies and stages. What is different is the emphasis on hermeneutics or the method of interpretation. This tendency has also included much scholarship on the history of philosophy and has had extensive influence on the human sciences.

IX. Bibliography: Introductions, overviews and specialized studies

Chattopadhyaya, D.P.; Embree, Lester; Mohanty, Jitendranath (Eds.)
*Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy* (Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992).

Anthology of important essays illustrating that "the underlying spirit of phenomenology and hermeneutics has been consciously followed by Indian philosophers and is not peculiar to Western thinkers."

Eliade, Mircea

Heidegger, Martin

Martin Heidegger
Husserl, Edmund  
*Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*. (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960) One of Husserl's most complete and accessible statements of his mature positions. To be read in conjunction with chapters 4 and 5 of Paul Ricoeur's *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967)

Jonas, Hans  

Sartre, Jean-Paul  
*The Transcendence of the Ego* (New York: Noonday Press, 1962 [1936-37], tr. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick) Brilliant study along Husserlian lines of the constitution of the self and ego or ego-genesis through reflection

Otto, Rudolph  
*The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923 [1917]) The book defines the concept of the holy as that which is numinous: a "non-rational, non-sensory experience or feeling whose primary and immediate object is outside the self". Sets a paradigm for the study of religion that focuses on the need to realize the religious as a non-reducible, original category in its own right. This paradigm was under much attack between approximately 1950 and 1990 but has made a strong comeback since then, after its phenomenological aspects have become more apparent.

Sokolowski, Robert  
*Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U.P., 2000) Straightforward introduction to Husserl's basic terms and the doing of phenomenology

Tillich, Paul  

Twiss, Sumner B. & Conser, Walter H. (Editors)  