An Irish High Priestess in India

By Lowell Thomas

Originally printed in the JULY-AUGUST 2007 issue of Quest magazine. 
Citation: Thomas, Lowell."An Irish High Priestess in India." Quest  95.4 (JULY-AUGUST 2007): 131-133, 139.

Theosophical Society - Lowell Thomas  This article is adapted from chapter ten of Lowell Thomas' book India: Land of the Black Pagoda, originally published in 1930. Some changes were made from British to American grammar to improve readability; otherwise this description is presented in its original form, reflecting the language, social structure, and customs of the times. Today, Madras is known as Chennai and Bombay is called Mumbai. Thomas had thought he would spend a month or two in India. Instead, he stayed for two years, leaving only when finaces ran out, not because he wanted to. His guide as he traveled though India was not a nattive, but an englishman, Major Francis Yeats-Brown, nicknamed Y. B., the author of The Lives of a Bengal Lancer.

This article is adapted from chapter ten of Lowell Thomas' book India: Land of the Black Pagoda, originally published in 1930. Some changes were made from British to American grammar to improve readability; otherwise this description is presented in its original form, reflecting the language, social structure, and customs of the times. Today, Madras is known as Chennai and Bombay is called Mumbai. Thomas had thought he would spend a month or two in India. Instead, he stayed for two years, leaving only when finances ran out, not because he wanted to. His guide as he traveled though India was not a native, but an Englishman, Major Francis Yeats-Brown, nicknamed Y. B., the author of The Lives of a Bengal Lancer.

Madras is the doyen of the British cities of the East Indies, dignified, delightful, and "somehow different." The black Tamil men with their long, straight hair gathered in a bunch at the top of their heads, carry umbrellas and fulfill to a nicety one's notions of the mild Hindu. The less opulent Tamils have noses like the beaks of birds. Their cheekbones are sharp. Their elbows are sharp. Their knees are sharp. Their bodies are mostly vein and bone, minus muscle and meat. They chew betel-nut which makes their teeth black and their lips red. They drink rice toddy, which makes them forget, temporarily, the nightmare that their lives must be.

But high-caste Madrasi people and prosperous untouchables become sleek in appearance and oval in shape, especially the women. Their dress consists of a long strip of cloth draped gracefully about the figure, showing their perfectly molded torsos from hip to breast like a column of burnished copper. They are hung, and placqued [covered], and laden with gold. If Ghengis Khan had seen the population of Madras nobody could have restrained him.

The burra sahibs, the captains of industry of Madras, are contentedly rich. They haven't the money-fever of Calcutta or Bombay. Every white man in Madras lives like a gentleman, with a "flivver" and a share in a sailing yacht. It is a city of great distances and a great many clubs. The Madras Club is one of the finest in Asia and their sheep's-head curry is a dish for Lucullus. Then if Lucullus desires he may repair to the Golf Club to correct his liver.

There also is a boat club, a gymkhana club, and the Adyar Club. What with bathing, boating, tennis, polo, golf, dancing, and dining at his five clubs, the "white man's burden" is very cheerfully borne here.

Every traveler should pay a visit to the Victoria Institute, where he will find excellent and moderately priced examples of the indigenous industries of a province where master craftsmen survive and art is still a living reality. Every province has now an exhibition of arts and crafts, but none is better managed than that of Madras.

The climate of Madras is certainly sticky, but it has never, during our three visits, been so bad as the orchid-house moisture of Bombay. There is plenty to see. Georgetown, Elihu Yale's church, the Cathedral of St. Tomo [St.Thomas], and the High Court, built in the Hindu-Saracenic style of thirty years ago, are all "worthy of inspection," as the painstaking guide-book says.

But it is at evening on the Adyar that the true spirit of the city speaks. The rippling river, the graceful palms against the evening sky, the cool breeze from the sea, the greenness, the peace of this suburb, are unrivaled in any of the great cities of India. The traveler will like Madras although he may not fancy Bombay and Calcutta, the other two presidency cities.

By a window overlooking the Adyar River sits an aged woman with silvery white hair. She sits cross-legged, in Eastern fashion, on a masnad [a small ceremonial rug]. Behind her is an embroidered bolster. Over the masnad is spread a Persian rug. She is dressed in white shawls with a border of royal purple, and the surroundings are as unmistakably Indian as her appearance is Irish.

Why does she sit here, like an Eastern queen? The answer to this question is a romance difficult to parallel in this materialistic age. This woman, who has long passed threescore years and ten, is an authoress, editor, orator, political leader, and the head of a religious movement whose forty thousand adherents are to be found in every quarter of the world.

As an authoress she has made her mark wherever the wisdom of the East is studied. As an editor, she has, through her paper, New India, a faithful public. As an orator she holds great audiences wherever she goes. Among the learned bodies she has addressed is the grave and ancient Sorbonne. As a political leader she has bitter enemies, and followers who idolize her. More than half a century ago, when scarcely out of her teens, she was the wife of an Anglican clergyman. She became a Roman Catholic, and left him. Then she became an agnostic and for several years worked in close association with the English reformer, Charles Bradlaugh. During this time she was an energetic materialist. Then she met Madame Blavatsky, the Russian spiritualist, and with characteristic courage threw her old opinions overboard. From earnestly believing nothing she came to believe almost everything, with equal enthusiasm! She gave up her work in London, where she had gained a reputation as an able speaker and a trenchant writer on social problems, and sailed for the East. From that time she has been a loyal disciple of Blavatsky.

In India she had to make her life anew. First she settled in Benares. Later she moved to Madras, and on Colonel Olcott's death she was elected the second president of the Theosophical Society, a post which she has held from that day to this, having been twice reelected.

This is her life-story in baldest outline. To tell of her trials and successes, of her friends and enemies, would need a volume. She is Irish and—saving her presence—she enjoys a fight. But she wouldn't admit this for a moment. Always she tries to turn the other cheek, but at times the ancient Eve will out. . . . She is a very gentle lady. There is nothing small about her. She never did a mean thing in her life, we feel quite sure.

Of the wisdom of her activities there has been much question; of the purity of her motives, none. Nor can her ability be disputed, even by her enemies, of whom she has aplenty. Annie Besant is a world-figure.

At a time when big-whiskered undergraduates were wondering whether they dared follow Newman or not, a little slip of a girl (oh, the madman her husband must have been not to realize the treasure he held!), brought up in sheltered surroundings, gave up home and faith and husband, to follow the light of Truth, as she saw it. She had hardly any money. She earned her living by writing for the newspapers. Through slough of despond and over uplands of hope she followed the light she saw, until at last, after many ups and downs, it has brought her here, to Adyar.

She is a tireless worker. When the Indian dawn is breaking over the Bay of Bengal, she is to be found sitting here just as we found her, cross-legged, surrounded by her work, writing, planning, dealing with the letters her secretary brings her, giving instructions to the officers of the Theosophical Society, giving advice to aspirants to the "kingly wisdom" and "kingly mystery," administering affairs that not only circle the earth, but "step from star to star."

Mrs. Besant has none of the false modesty of the unknown. She has seen too much of the world to object to facing the camera. Yet she has none of the airs of a high priestess, none of the moods of a mystic. She is simple and direct, a person of singular charm. Her favorite mottoes probably are: "For God, for King and Country," and "There is No Religion Higher than Truth": for these two adorn the walls of her room. Every one who knows her, not Theosophists only, will tell you that she has lived these ideals throughout her strenuous and striking career. Among her followers (many of whom, by the way, believe her to be an incarnation of the famous Italian philosopher, Giordano Bruno) she is believed to be rather a despot (and they surely need to be galvanized with the fear of God occasionally, for like all such bodies this one contains a proportion of people that the world would call cranks, or something harsher), but to us outsiders, she is a delightful, soft-spoken, cultured old lady. And in her bright brown eyes there is a hidden fire.

The objects of Mrs. Besant's colony at Adyar, and of Theosophists at large, are described to us as both spiritual and practical. The spiritual side is rather difficult to explain in a paragraph, but briefly it is (a) to promote the brotherhood of man, (b) to study comparative religion and philosophy, and (c) to explore the hidden powers latent in man. Practically, members can believe what they like. They can be Hindus or Holy Rollers, Buddhists or Baptists. "There is a good deal of difference of opinion on matters of doctrine," said Mrs. Besant, "and I think that this is a very healthy sign. Unless we have differences of opinion on matters of doctrine we shall inevitably become a church or sect. It is not our business to become either, for we are a society of students, and if all students agree there will be a very poor advance."

But the common denominator for the average Theosophist seems to be a belief in Karma. Karma is "the good law," whereby every action in this world has its inevitable consequence, or reaction. In other words, in this life or succeeding lives, each shall reap as he has sown. Gradually through the experience of countless births, the soul learns the lessons of Karma and attains to the "kingly wisdom and the kingly mystery of the unborn, undying, unbegun." It then leaves the earth, to seek expression in some other flesh. . . .

As to the inner or esoteric section, their beliefs may be crudely summarized as follows, by outsiders who are not initiated into their secrets: Each age of the world, from the æon-long past of the Lemurians, who lived on the banks of the Mediterranean, and the Atlanteans, whose civilization sank beneath the ocean waves in far centuries of geologic time, has had a Manu, or typical Man, who sets the example to humanity for the race that is to come and strikes the keynote of its religion. The Manu of this age, say these Theosophists, is the Lord Gautama Buddha. But they believe the world to be now on the threshold of a new age. The new world-teacher, the successor to Buddha, is soon to come, to give light and leading to the world. The day of the Messiah is at hand. Already a herald of the great teacher has come in the body of a Brahmin youth, young Krishnamurti, known to the elect as "Alcyone." His is a thoughtful, beautiful face, with the eyes of a mystic.

A gentle-voiced American, in horn-rimmed glasses, takes us to see the practical work that the Theosophists are doing in Adyar. His costume, consisting of a purple skull-cap, a white shirt worn with the tail out, and a white loincloth, makes it difficult for us to believe that he was a resident of Madison, Wisconsin, not long ago, and an instructor in the university there. All the Occidentals at Adyar—British, American, French, Scandinavians, and others—adopt the cool and comfortable garments of Hindustan. Many have taken high university degrees in Europe, but they wear dhoties none the less.

On our way to the Theosophical Publishing House, we pass Mrs. Besant's Rolls-Royce-the gift of an Indian maharajah-waiting to take her to the city offices of her daily paper, New India. At the Publishing House we see learned Sanskrit works, and well-bound books in English, which are being distributed to the four points of the compass. We continue our stroll around the two hundred and sixty acres of the domain, which contains some two hundred Theosophists. We pass Leadbeater Chambers: the Seva Ashrama, which is the headquarters of the Order of the Brothers of Service—a sort of corps d'eite of Theosophists, vowed to poverty and obedience, and numbering twenty-five members who have renounced all worldly possessions to work for their order: the Annie Zoroastrian Home: Miss Bell's bungalow: the Olcott bungalow, where the first president lived: the Masonic Temple: the workshop: the power-house: the dairy and students' quarters, where a successful agricultural school has been started: and the Vasanta Press, where a monthly and a weekly magazine and many books are printed.

Then back to headquarters. Still we have seen nothing of education. The society maintains five schools in England, three in Scotland, and a thousand pupils in Ceylon. Locally, the Olcott-Panchama schools were pioneers in the work of educating the depressed classes of Madras Presidency and continue to do an immense amount of good.

There are some fifteen hundred branches of Theosophists scattered throughout the world. Even Iceland has its lodge, named "Jolabladid." In Java a group of devout Dutchmen meet for the purpose of promoting "abstinence from gambling, opium, alcoholic liquors, debauch, slander, lying, theft, and gluttony."

America now has about twenty thousand members. But the strongest claim that Adyar can make on the gratitude of the world, is its library of palm-leaf manuscripts. Here are shelves and shelves of ancient rolls, written by the monks of Tibetan monasteries and the pundits of the Ganges plains. It contains the garnered wisdom of elder civilizations, this library. There is an atmosphere of perfect peace here—where Pierre Loti studied twenty years ago—something of the quiet heart and level eyes of the Asian mystics. In the work of translating and classifying these manuscripts a group of learned Brahmins are engaged, and although the work progresses slowly from lack of funds, still it does progress. Slowly but surely the knowledge of long ago, which would have been one with the all-consuming dust of India but for the enterprise of Adyar, is being brought in print to Western eyes. Who knows what treasures of vision these pundits may unlock?

Here then in Adyar, and elsewhere, is a society of persons, the Order of the Star in the East, waiting and working for the coming Manu. "The striking of His hour is nigh when He shall come to mankind again as He did so often in the past." And we, who see but as in a glass darkly, can yet give our respect to an earnest band of workers who are preparing for the Kingdom that is to come, as they believe, in the days that are near at hand.


When You Are One with Every Heart That Beats

By Pedro and Linda Oliveira
 
Originally printed in the JULY-AUGUST 2007 issue of Quest magazine. 
Citation: Oliveira, Pedro and Linda."When You Are One with Every Heart That Beats." Quest  95.4 (JULY-AUGUST 2007): 141-143.
 
 
Theosophical Society - Pedro Oliveira joined the Brazilian Section of the Theosophical Society in 1978 and worked in several capacities. He served as international secretary at Adyar between 1992 and 1996. In 2001, he was elected president of the Indo-Pacific Federation of the TS, and re-elected in 2004. Pedro works as education coordinator of the TS in Australia and has lectured extensively in Australia, the Indo-Pacific region, and other countries as well.Pedro Oliveira

The Theosophical Society is now 130 years old. Founded in New York City on November 17, 1875, the Society has had only seven international presidents since its inception: Col. Henry Steel Olcott, Dr. Annie Besant, Dr. George Arundale, C. Jinarajadasa, N. Sri Ram, John B. S. Coats, and Radha Burnier.

An e-learning course offered by the Olcott School of Theosophy of the Theosophical Society in America features each President's inaugural address, journal excerpts, selected writings, historical photographs, study questions, and audio commentary. It also features a video interview conducted by Dr. Tony Lysy, Dean of the Olcott Institute at Wheaton with Joy Mills, former international vice-president and past president of both the American and Australian sections of the Theosophical Society.

Theosophical Society - Linda Oliveira  joined the Theosophical Society in 1971, first as a member of Canberra Lodge and subsequently as a member of Blavatsky Lodge, Sydney. She completed a Bachelor of Arts degree at the Australian National University, majoring in psychology and political science. In 1981, she was a student at the Krotona School of Theosophy in California, and also worked for a time at the national headquarters of the American section. Linda was a member of the General Council and has held the office of national president of the Theosophical Society in Australia since 2002. She believes deeply that a genuine exploration and understanding of the Wisdom teachings can provide an opportunity for human spiritual transformation, which is so badly needed in today's world.    Linda Oliveira

This well-structured and engaging course includes many tasks, but is very rewarding. It is an exploration of the history of the Society through the lives and work of its leaders. Joy Mills, who has been a member for over sixty years, is a veritable living archive of the Society's work as she has known or met all its presidents, except for Olcott and Besant. She insightfully points out that a living thread weaves its way through the contributions of all these individuals, despite their differences in temperament and outlook: and that is a reverence and commitment to universal brotherhood, freedom of thought, and Theosophy as a living Wisdom.

Henry Steel Olcott (1875-1907)

In his inaugural address, Olcott said that in the future the impartial historian would not be able to ignore the formation of the Theosophical Society. A number of authors have recognized the positive influence the Society has had in the cultural and spiritual progress of the world. Olcott was a journalist, a lawyer, an agriculturalist, an investigator of psychic phenomena, and a man of absolute integrity. He was also a healer and helped thousands with his gift. His contribution to the revival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) was outstanding and is remembered to this day in that country. He also had a deep interest in the education of the underprivileged children in India and Ceylon. One of his most enduring contributions was the purchase of the property for the International Headquarters at Adyar in 1882. Here he established the Adyar Library and Research Center in 1886, which is patterned after the ancient and legendary Library at Alexandria.

Annie Besant (1907-1933)

Annie Besant was a warrior spirit and fought for many causes. Before joining the TS, Annie Besant was a prominent worker in the field of social and educational reform in England. She had an exceptional mind, and her early book, The Building of the Kosmos (1894), is a deep presentation of Theosophy.

In 1908, she formed the Theosophical Order of Service (TOS), which aims at applying the theosophical worldview in every department of life. She had a global vision. In her inaugural address as president of the TS, she encouraged the "perfect toleration of all differences." Her contribution to India's political freedom and cultural regeneration was crucial and thousands came to listen to her speak. She was also one of the keynote speakers at the 1893 Parliament of World Religions in Chicago.

In the introduction to The Secret Doctrine, HPB had mentioned that a more advanced student would come in the twentieth century to further expand the teaching of the Wisdom Tradition. In 1909, Besant's colleague, C. W. Leadbeater, discovered the young J. Krishnamurti on the Adyar beach in Madras (now Chennai). In 1911, Besant and Leadbeater formed The Order of the Star in the East around Krishnamurti. Annie Besant nurtured Krishnamurti who held a deep love for her until the end of his life. She maintained that "diversities enrich the movement, as long as love rules and charity judges."

George Sydney Arundale (1934-1945)

George Arundale was like a son to Annie Besant. He worked very closely with her on her educational and cultural programs in India.

As a boy in London, young George had contact with HPB, and she gave him a box of chocolates. As a result, Arundale was committed to helping young people. He had a commanding presence which was felt throughout the Society as well as an enduring sense of humour. For him, Theosophy was a living reality and very practical.

Arundale was president of the TS during the war years (1939-1945). He encouraged young people to help the millions who died in the war by working with the dead on the subtler planes of existence. His motto was: "Together though differently" and he advocated a non-dogmatic presentation of Theosophy.

Curupumullage Jinarajadasa (1946-1953)

Jinarajadasa, or Brother Raja, as he was affectionately known, was a transitional president. A remarkable person and well-known as a lecturer and writer, Jinarajadasa emphasized the aesthetic side of Theosophy.

Discovered by Leadbeater in Ceylon at the end of the nineteenth century, Brother Raja was educated at Cambridge and became a linguist. He lectured in Spanish as well as Portuguese in many South American countries.

Jinarajadasa led the reconstruction work of the TS in Europe after the war. He was a great supporter of the United Nations, and during his presidency the Society was briefly affiliated with the UN, as an Non-Government Organization.

Brother Raja had a special interest in theosophical history and was a great archivist, having edited the Golden Book of the Theosophical Society. His book The New Humanity of the Intuition presented his view of the future development of humanity.

Jinarajadasa was a talent scout. He brought many young members from different parts of the world into contact with each other. He also conceived the Ritual of the Mystic Star, which celebrates the essential unity of all religions. Theosophy was for him a "joyous experience."

Nilakanta Sri Ram (1953-1973)

N. Sri Ram pointed to a different dimension of Theosophy. His contribution represents a new perception—the awakening of consciousness to the buddhic (intuitional) level. For Sri Ram, Theosophy was Wisdom in action.

In her comments about his first visit to the United States in 1948, Joy Mills remarks: "A most remarkable person. A presence of gentleness, a quiet power." N. Sri Ram presided over the 1966 World Congress in Salzburg, Austria, with calm, inherent dignity and a quiet and dignified authority. During his presidency the current building for the Adyar Library and Research Center was erected.

N. Sri Ram was a world traveller, a scholar, and a real Theosophist. He had an aphoristic quality to his thought and writings and a deep regard for Krishnamurti and his teachings. The writings of N. Sri Ram emphasize the possibility that consciousness could unfold its own essential nature into a state of wisdom and love. All those who came in contact with him were deeply affected by his gentleness, wisdom, and selflessness.

John Balfour Symington Coats (1973-1979)

John Coats was very much loved by young people and he encouraged them in their work for the Society. He presided over the World Congress in New York City in November 1975, which commemorated the centenary of the Theosophical Society, inviting Boris de Zirkoff to be the keynote speaker.

Joy reminisces that at the official banquet on that occasion, John wanted an empty chair at the centre of the table, "dedicated to the Great Ones." "There was presence, a silence," Joy recalls, "that those of us who were there will never forget."

Coats was an extrovert who embraced everybody--literally. He was a passionate speaker, had a tremendous love for humanity, and toured the theosophical world many times.

In the centenary issue of The Theosophist (October 1979), Coats wrote: "Throughout the world, let the love of power be replaced by the Power of Love."

Radha Sriram Burnier (1980-)

Elected in 1980, Radha Burnier has been re-elected ever since. The daughter of Sri Ram, she was born in Adyar and is a Sanskrit scholar, with a MA degree from the Benares Hindu University.

She emphasizes the Wisdom aspect of the theosophical teachings, and her keynote is Human Regeneration. She sees Theosophy as the Wisdom Religion, an expression used by HPB in her writings.

Radha leads a life of disciplined simplicity and loves animals. She enjoys the presence of many furry friends in her house (including a dog named Soli).

Radha has also toured the TS world several times over and shares with members and the public her insight into the human condition and how the human mind can come out of its predicament.

Universal Brotherhood: the cornerstone

Each successive President, in his or her individual way, has struck the same essential keynote: the Theosophical Society exists to help people realize the profound truth of Universal Brotherhood; that humanity, in its essence and at its heart, is forever one family in its fascinating diversity of creeds, cultures, and dreams.

In order to achieve this goal, freedom of thought is vital as "there is no doctrine, no opinion, by whomsoever taught or held, that is in any way binding on any member of the Society, none which any member is not free to accept or reject."

For anyone interested in the history of the Theosophical Society and its work, this course is an important and informative source. It shows why the Founders' dream is still alive after 130 years.


Pedro Oliveira joined the TS in Brazil in 1978 and worked in several capacities. He served as international secretary at Adyar between 1992 and 1996. In 2001, he was elected president of the Indo-Pacific Federation of the TS, and re-elected in 2004. He works as education coordinator of the TS in Australia and has lectured extensively, in Australia, the Indo-Pacific region, and other countries as well.

Linda Oliveira joined the Theosophical Society in 1971, first as a member of Canberra Lodge and subsequently as a member of Blavatsky Lodge, Sydney. She completed a Bachelor of Arts degree at the Australian National University, majoring in psychology and political science. In 1981, she was a student at the Krotona School of Theosophy in California, and also worked for a time at the national headquarters of the American section. Linda was a member of the General Council and has held the office of national president of the Theosophical Society in Australia since 2002. She believes deeply that a genuine exploration and understanding of the Wisdom teachings can provide an opportunity for human spiritual transformation, which is so badly needed in today's world.


A Notable Theosophist: Benjamin Lee Whorf

By John Algeo

Benjamin Lee Whorf was by profession an inspector and engineer for the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, but his avocation was linguistics and the study of languages. He studied at Yale with one of this country's leading anthropological linguists, Edward Sapir. Following Sapir, Whorf became a leading exponent of a concept called variously the "linguistic relativity principle,"the "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis," or most often just the "Whorf hypothesis." It is,over-simply put, that the language we speak affects the way we think. His ideas are much richer and more complex than that and have very practical implications for the evolution of humanity.

Whorf's ideas imply that, because the language we speak affects the way we think, it also affects the way we view the world around us. We habitually formulate our perceptions of the world in language, according to the particular biases and prejudices inherent in whatever language we know. Thus language limits the way we perceive reality, the way we think about it, and the way we talk about it. But it need not do so. If we are aware of those limitations, we can compensate for them and view the world freshly and newly.

The overcoming of such limitations of the mind is related to the Buddhist concept of "mindfulness." And it is also what H. P. Blavatsky's Voice of the Silence is talking about in its fifth and sixth verses: "The Mind is the great Slayer of the Real. Let the Disciple slay the Slayer." "Slaying" is, of course,a metaphor. The mind "slays" because it tricks and misleads us through its conditioning (especially, according to the Whorf hypothesis, by the language we speak). To "slay the slayer" is to trick the trickster by meditative mindfulness.

A recent study of the Whorf hypothesis observes: "Benjamin Whorf was an extraordinary person whose theories about linguistic thinking developed more than half a century ago anticipated in several respects ways of talking and thinking about language in cognition which are only now gaining currency incognitive science" (Lee xviii). Another linguistic historian has identified Whorf as "a key figure in the development of 20th century linguistics" (Lee 9,summarizing Darnell).

Whorf was also a member of the Theosophical Society and of the Fritz Kunzcircle, whose members were concerned with applying Theosophical principles to education and intellectual life. Moreover, the fullest exposition of the Whorf hypothesis was first published in the Adyar Theosophist magazine for 1942 in a multipart article entitled "Language, Mind, and Reality." That article sets forth Whorf's ideas in Theosophical terms and from a Theosophical perspective, particularly the relevance of the distinction between lower and higher manas (the Sankrit term for "mind") to language capacity, acquisition, and use.

Our "lower" mind is closely connected with our physical brains and is molded by the experiences we have in life; so it is also called the "empirical" mind and is part of our personality, thus varying with every person. Our "higher" mind, on the other hand, is what Kant called the "pure reason" and the Greeks "nous"; it is anterior to our personal, empirical mind and is essentially the same in structure for all human beings. The difference between the "lower"and "higher" minds is roughly parallel to the Jungian distinction between our personal conscious and the collective unconscious.

We human beings all have the same capacity for perceiving the world around us because we all have higher minds that are structured in the same way.The evolutionary development of that mind is what makes us human and also makes language possible. Our capacity for language is a faculty of our higher minds,but the particular language systems we learn and use are related to our lower minds. The differences among the various language systems of human beings all over the world and the effect of those differences on our thinking processes are what interested Whorf.

The publication of the major statement of his ideas in the Theosophist was a result of "Whorf's long standing association with The Theosophical Society, a nonsectarian international society . . . which . . . promotes a world view in which the universe and everything in it is regarded as an interrelated and interdependent whole" (Lee 21). Whorf himself (282) said that he chose a Theosophical publication because "of all groups of people with whom I have come in contact, Theosophical people seem the most capable of becoming excited about ideas--new ideas."


References

Blavatsky, Helena Petrovna. The Voice of the Silence. 1889. Reprint Wheaton, IL: Theosophical Publishing House, 1992.

Darnell, Regna. Edward Sapir: Linguist, Anthropologist, Humanist. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990

Lee, Penny. The Whorf Theory Complex. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1996.

Whorf, Benjamin Lee. "Language, Mind and Reality." Theosophist  63, parts 1 and 2 (1942): 281 -91, 25 -37. Reprint in Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, ed. John B. Carroll (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1956, 1974, 1997).



John Algeo is Professor Emeritus in English linguistics from the University ofGeorgia and editor of volume 6 of the Cambridge History of the English Language: English in North America, published by Cambridge University Press.


[The following are extracts from Whorf's "Language, Mind and Reality."]

We must find out more about language! Already we know enough about it to know that it is not what the great majority of men, lay or scientific, think it is. The fact that we talk almost effortlessly, unaware of the exceedingly complex mechanism we are using, creates an illusion. We think we know how it is done, that there is no mystery; we have all the answers. Alas, what wrong answers!

The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. The patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. His thinking itself is in a language in English, in Sanskrit, in Chinese. And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others,

in which is culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness.

It is as if the personal mind, which selects words but is largely oblivious to pattern, were in the grip of a higher, far more intellectual mind which has very little notion of houses and beds and soup-kettles, but can systematize and mathematize on a scale and scope that no mathematician of the schools ever remotely approached.

And now appears a great fact of human brotherhood--that human beings are all alike in this respect. So far as we can judge from the systematics of language, the higher mind or "unconscious" of a Papuan head-hunter can mathematize quite as well as that of Einstein; and conversely, scientist and yokel, scholar and tribesman, all use their personal consciousness in the same dim-witted sort of way, and get into similar kinds of logical impasse.

The higher mind would seem to be able to do any kind of purely intellectual feat, but not to "be conscious" on the personal level. That is, it does not focus on practical affairs and on the personal ego in its personal, immediate environment. Certain dreams and exceptional mental states may lead us to suppose it to be conscious on its own plane, and occasionally its consciousness may "come through" to the personality; but barring techniques like Yoga, it ordinarily makes no nexus with the personal consciousness.

We are compelled in many cases to read into nature fictitious acting-entities simply because our sentence patterns require our verbs, when not imperative, to have substantives before them. We are obliged to say "it flashed"or "a light flashed," setting up an actor it, or a light, to perform what we call an action, flash. But the flashing and the light are the same; there is nothing which does something, and no doing. Hopi says only rehpi. Hopi can have verbs without subjects, and this gives to that language power as a logical system for understanding certain aspects of the cosmos. . . . A change in language can transform our appreciation of the cosmos.

The lower personal mind, caught in a vaster world inscrutable to its methods, uses its strange gift of language to weave the web of Mãyã or illusion,to make a provisional analysis of reality and then regard it as final.

The scientific understanding of very diverse languages--not necessarily to speak them, but to analyze their structure--is a lesson in brotherhood which is brotherhood in the universal human principle--the brotherhood of the "Sons of Manas." It causes us to transcend the boundaries of local cultures, nationalities, physical peculiarities dubbed "race," and to find that in their linguistic systems, though these systems differ widely, yet in the order, harmony and beauty of the systems, and in their respective subtleties and penetrating analysis of reality, all men are equal.


Animals and Us: Quotations

Quotations from Ahimsa (Dynamic Compassion), by Nathaniel Altman (Wheaton, IL: Theosophical Publishing House, 1980).

 

I care not much for a man's religion whose dog and cat are not the better for it.

— Abraham Lincoln

 

Birds are given wings to fly, and they were not created in order to be shut up in tiny cages, where they scarcely have room to hop about. Those who claim to be fond of them should desire their liberty, and if they are anxious to see them and learn more of their habits they can do this by going in for bird observation or "hunting" them with cameras instead of nets and guns. We hope the day will soon come when these beautiful creatures will no more be confined behind bars, but will be free to enjoy the liberty which their Creator gave them.
 

— W. A. Holmes-Gore

 

It is much more exciting and difficult to "shoot" with a camera than with a gun, and I wish that more and more adventurous young men would give up the gun in favor of the camera.

—Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

 

It is my opinion that hunting for sport is hardly a sport in any just sense. The contestants are not evenly matched. If the hunted were equipped with the same powerful and often expensive weapons as the two-legged hunter, and could be taught to use them, then hunting might be more sportsman like. But the animals are not likely to be consulted in the matter or given such a break.

—Saul K. Padover

 

God put the animals in our keeping and made us responsible for their care and protection. We live together on the same planet. Yet, seeking to escape pain ourselves, we do not hesitate to inflict it on our fellow creatures, without compunction. Sowing pain and death, what do we expect to reap?

—Peter Hoffman

 

In a universe which embraces all types of life and consciousness and all material forms through which these manifest, nothing which is ethically wrong can ever be scientifically right; . . . in an integrated cosmos of spirit and matter one law must pervade all levels and all planes. This is the basic principle upon which the whole case against vivisection rests. Cicero summed it up in the four words: "No cruelty is useful".

—M. Beddow Bayly

 

I have just been through the process of killing the cistudo [box tortoise] for the sake of science; but I cannot excuse myself for this murder, and see that such actions are inconsistent with the poetic perception, however they may serve science, and will affect the quality of my observations. I pray that I may walk more innocently and serenely through nature. No reasoning whatever reconciles me to this act. It affects my day injuriously. I have lost some self-respect. I have a murderer's experience to a degree.

—Henry David Thoreau

 

The demand for vegetarian food will increase our production of the right kind of plant foods. We shall cease to breed pigs and other animals for food, thereby ceasing to be responsible for the horror of slaughter houses where millions of creatures cry in vain because of man's selfishness. If such concentration camps for slaughtering continue, can peace ever come to earth? Can we escape the responsibility for misery when we are practicing killing every day of our lives by consciously or unconsciously supporting this trade of slaughter? Peace cannot come where Peace is not given.

—Rukmini Devi Arundale

 

A man can live and be healthy without killing animals for food; therefore, if he eats meat, he participates in taking animal life merely for the sake of his appetite. And to act so is immoral.

—Leo Tolstoy

 

Perhaps the time has come to formulate a moral code which would govern our relations with the great creatures of the sea as well as with those on dry land. That this will come to pass is our dearest wish. If human civilization is going to invade the waters of the earth, then let it be first of all to carry a message of respect for all life.

—Jacques-Yves Cousteau

 

To affirm life is to deepen, to make more inward, and to exalt the will-to-live. At the same time, the man who has become a thinking being feels a compulsion to give to every will-to-live the same reverence for life that he gives to his own. He experiences that other life as his own. He accepts as being good: to preserve life, to raise to its highest value life which is capable of development; and as being evil: to destroy life, to injure life, to repress life which is capable of development. This is the absolute, fundamental principle of the moral, and it is a necessity of thought.

—Albert Schweitzer

 

You think you can stamp on that caterpillar? All right, you've done it. It wasn't difficult. And now, make the caterpillar again.

—Lanza del Vasto

 

We have no right to inflict suffering and death on another living creature unless there is some unavoidable necessity for it, and we ought all of us to feel what a horrible thing it is to cause suffering and death out of mere thoughtlessness. And this conviction has influenced me only more and more strongly with time. I have grown more and more certain that at the bottom of our heart we all think this, and that we fail to acknowledge it and to carry our belief into practice chiefly as sentimentalists, though partly also because we allow our best feelings to get blunted. But I vowed that I would never let my feelings get blunted, and that I would never be afraid of the reproach of sentimentalism.

—Albert Schweitzer

 

Life is as dear to a mute creature as it is to a man. Compassion and living kindness are the hallmarks of achievement and happiness.

—Dalai Lama

 

All beings are fond of themselves, they like pleasure, they hate pain, they shun destruction, they like life and want to live long. To all, life is dear; hence their life should be protected.

—Mahavira

 

All life, I regard, as sacred. And, it seems to me, in ethics we are concerned not alone with mankind, but also with animals. The ethical ideal, as I understand it, is: Help all life; have sympathy with all life; avoid injuring anything living.

—T. L. Vaswai

Do Horses Gallop in Their Sleep: The Problem of Animal Consciousness

Originally printed in the JULY-AUGUST 2001 issue of Quest magazine. 
Citation: Cartmill, Matt. "Do Horses Gallop in Their Sleep: The Problem of Animal Consciousness." Quest  89. 4 (July-August 2001): 124-131.

By Matt Cartmill

Theosophical Society - Matt Cartmill, PhD (Chicago) is Professor of Biological Anthropology and Anatomy at Duke University's School of Medicine. He is the author of more than a hundred scholarly and popular works on anatomy, evolution, and the philosophy of science. He is a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and has been a Guggenheim Fellow, President of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists, and a Phi Beta Kappa Visiting ScholarLet me propose a thought experiment. Imagine, if you will, that there's a certain clump of nerve cells in the brain that's essential for conscious awareness. Now suppose that a certain drug suppresses neural activity in just this nucleus, with no effect on the rest of the brain. Subjects who take this drug do things as usual, but they experience nothing. The drug converts them into sleepwalkers. Finally, imagine that I've developed a new form of this drug, which has permanent effects. It abolishes consciousness forever, with no effect on behavior. I want to test it on you. How much will you charge to take it?

I think the question answers itself. Spending your life as a sleepwalker is equivalent to being dead, and so you will charge me whatever price you would charge to commit suicide.

I offer this thought experiment to dispel the notion that conscious awareness is too metaphysical and subjective a phenomenon for science to concern itself with. The phenomenon of consciousness is the source of all value in our lives. As such, it should be at the top of the scientific agenda. Yet despite its fundamental importance, consciousness is a subject that most scientists are reluctant to deal with. We know practically nothing about either its mechanisms or its evolution. In fact, many distinguished scientists and philosophers believe that consciousness has no evolutionary history, because they think that human beings are the only creatures that have it. Although most scientists will admit in private that our close animal relatives probably have mental lives something like ours (because, after all, they have bodies and brains and behavior that resemble ours), a lot of scientists are reluctant to say so plainly and publicly; and those who do can count on being accused of sentimentality and anthropomorphism.

If you have a dog, you have probably had the experience of seeing your dog search out a favorite toy and bring it to you in hopes of getting you to play with him. It's hard even to describe these familiar experiences without saying things like, "The dog was trying to find his ball," or "The dog wanted me to play with him." But scientists aren't supposed to say things like that, at least when we have our lab coats on. If we discuss such things at all, we prefer to do so in some way that doesn't involve attributing intentions or any other mental states to the dog.

There are at least two ways we can do this. First, we can use clumsy behavioral circumlocutions for mental language. Instead of saying, "The dog looked for his ball until he found it," we can say something like, "The dog exhibited repeated bouts of investigative behavior, which ceased after he contacted the ball." This somehow manages to suggest that the dog wasn't thinking about the ball while he was looking for it, and that he didn't perceive anything when he got it in his mouth.

Second, if we find these circumlocutions silly and tedious, we can adopt some variant of what is sometimes called "logical behaviorism," in which the mental words are still used but they are redefined in terms of the probabilities of certain behaviors. In this view, a dog's intentions and desires and beliefs turnout, when properly understood, not to be something inside the dog, but theoretical constructs pinned on the dog by a human observer. Therefore, the human observer can know whether the dog has intentions and desires and beliefs, but the dog can't.

Why Not Attribute Consciousness to Animals?

Why do scientists and philosophers go through all these contortions to avoid attributing mental states to animals? There are several reasons, some of which are better than others. There's no doubt that sentimentality and uncritical anthropomorphism are real temptations, and that they should be avoided in describing and analyzing the behavior of nonhuman organisms. A lot of us succumb to these temptations. We all know people who insist on telling you what kind of music their begonia likes or what their cat thinks about Rush Limbaugh. These people are mistaken. And scientists sometimes make similar mistakes. Some of the early Darwinians in particular were guilty of this sort of thing. Because Darwin's opponents often cited the mental and moral differences between people and beasts as reasons for rejecting the whole idea of evolution, many of his early followers tried to play down those differences by repeating anecdotes they had heard about the nobility of dogs and the self-sacrifice of chickens.

The British psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan was dismayed by this uncritical attribution of human mental states to animals, and he tried to put a stop to it.In 1894, Morgan laid down the following law:

In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale.

"Higher" here turns out to mean "humanlike," as it often did in the nineteenth century. Successive generations of experimental psychologists have adopted this dictum as a fundamental axiom called Morgan's Canon. It's generally thought of as a special case of Occam's Razor, the principle that you shouldn't make up entities unless you have to. By this view, we are required to deny mental events in animals whenever we can, in the name of parsimony.

All this sounds reasonable, but there's a fundamental flaw in it. Because we have mental events, we already know that there are such things in the universe. Denying them to animals therefore doesn't save anything; we have the same number of entities on our hands no matter what we decide about animal minds. So Occam's Razor doesn't provide any support for Morgan's Canon. In fact, some of the animal rights philosophers claim that Occam's Razor is on their side. They argue that if we're going to invoke intentions, desires, beliefs, and other mental phenomena in accounting for our own actions, we should explain other animals' behavior in similar terms whenever we can--again, in the name of parsimony.

The problem with Morgan's Canon comes into sharp focus if we transfer the argument from the brain to the kidney. Consider this version:

In no case may we interpret an animal's urine as the outcome of humanlike biochemical processes, if we can find any other way of explaining it.

If Morgan's Canon represents a safe assumption, so does this one. But it's obvious that this version is ridiculous, and that physiologists would think I was crazy if I insisted they adopt this rule to avoid the temptations of anthroporenalism. Then why does Morgan's Canon seem so much more plausible than this one? Are neurologists just more gullible than urologists? Or is there something special about events in the brain that makes them different from events in the kidneys?

Part of the answer is that we don't care about kidneys the way we care about brains, because brain events are a source of human status and kidney events are not. Our mental abilities are markers of the moral boundary between animals and people. Because nonhuman animals lack some of those mental abilities, we regard them as property, to be used for our ends in any way we choose--on the dinner table, or in scientific experiments, or transformed into soap and shoes and lampshades. The only moral constraint that we observe on our use of other animals is an obligation not to make them suffer. And we acknowledge that duty only because we believe that at least some of the animals are on our side of the second big line we draw across the moral landscape--the boundary between sentience and non-sentience, between things that are conscious and things that aren't. So both of our major moral boundaries are defined by things that go on in the brain.

Up to this point, I have been assuming that mental events are, or are produced by, events in the brain. Scientists rarely question this assumption, but philosophers question it a lot. Brain events, they point out, are objective and public; mental events are subjective and private. This is the other crucial difference between the brain and the kidneys--and the other source of scientists' qualms about the question of animal consciousness.

The intrinsic subjectivity of consciousness makes scientists uneasy. Being conscious is the same thing as having private experiences; and the scientific method is fundamentally committed to the assumption that private experiences don't count as evidence. Only publicly accessible and repeatable experiences have that status. If somebody makes a claim that you can't check out for yourself, you're not obliged to take it seriously. This makes science constitutionally antiauthoritarian, which is good; but it also makes it unreceptive to claims about consciousness and its contents. Most of the recent literature on the subject of consciousness is not really about consciousness at all, but about either neurology or behavior. These are public phenomena, and scientists know how to deal with them. So they spend a lot of time trying to convince themselves that studying these things is somehow the same thing as studying consciousness--like the drunk in the story who lost his wallet in Central Park, but went looking for it in Times Square because the light was better there.

Artificial Intelligence versus Human Essence

The field of computer science called artificial intelligence grew out of these assumptions. In 1950, the English computer theorist Alan Turing offered a famous test for telling whether machines can think. He called it "the imitationgame." Suppose, he said, that we can write a program that will exchange messages with you. If, after five minutes of sending messages back and forth, you can't tell whether you've been chatting with a human being or a computer, then the machine has a human mind--because that's what having a human mind means: being able to carry on a human conversation. What other test could there be? And Turing predicted that some of us would see such machines within our lifetimes."I believe," wrote Turing, "that in about fifty years' time it will be possible to program computers, with a storage capacity of about 109, to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than a 70 percent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning."

It's exactly fifty years later now, and 109 equals around 128 megabytes. You can buy the supercomputer of Alan Turing's fondest dreams off the shelf at Sears for the price of a beat-up used car. Far bigger machines can be had at higher prices. But none of them has yet been programmed to play the imitation game successfully. What went wrong?

I think what went wrong wasn't just Alan Turing but the whole Western conception of what it means to be human. Our traditions encourage us to define ourselves not by what we are, but by how we are different: to think of the human essence not in terms of our properties, but in terms of our peculiarities--the small subset of human traits that we don't share with any other creatures. Many of these human peculiarities hinge on our unique skill in manipulating symbols, and that also happens to be what philosophers get paid for doing. It's not surprising, therefore, that philosophers and professors from Plato on down to Noam Chomsky have told us that juggling words and numbers is the defining excellence that makes people special, and that animals that lack it are mere objects. Marcus Aurelius summed it up in this maxim: "Use animals and other things and objects freely; but behave in a social spirit toward human beings, because they can reason."

Many Western thinkers have gone further and insisted that because animals can't talk, their mental lives are defective in big ways, or even nonexistent."Thinking," wrote Wittgenstein, "is essentially the activity of operating with signs." That view of thinking naturally appeals to college professors, who sometimes get so consumed by operating with signs that they wander around their campuses talking to themselves and tripping over shrubs. And since nonhuman animals aren't very good at operating with signs, many professional types have been reluctant to grant that beasts can have mental lives at all.

Because Western thinkers have always attached so much importance to juggling symbols as a marker of human status, and so little importance to walking around without tripping over things (which couldn't be very important, because a donkey can do it just as well as a philosopher), it was inevitable that when we managed to build a symbol-juggling engine--a machine that could beat us all at chess and prove the four-color theorem--our philosophers would try to persuade us that it was human. Once we taught it to play the imitation game, they assured us, it would be just like one of us. But so far, it has proved impossible to program such an engine to succeed at the imitation game. The reason is that, although a computer has many of the symbol-manipulating abilities that we prize so highly,it lacks the subtler and more mysterious skills that come with being a sentient animal, inhabiting and experiencing the world in a living body.

Computer metaphors have come to dominate our thinking about brain processes and mental events. They predispose us to believe that mental events are algorithmic--that is, that they are produced by executing a programmatic list of logically connected instructions--and that digital computers (which are algorithm machines) will eventually become conscious if only we can run are algorithm program on the right kind of hardware with the proper stored data. But as the philosopher John Searle has argued forcefully, there are good reasons for thinking that conscious awareness isn't, and can't be, produced by running a computer program.

A digital computer is essentially a grid of slots, each of which can be either full or empty. We think of these as ones and zeroes. Some of these slots are linked causally by rules of operation, which provide that when a certain pattern shows up in some area, the contents of other slots are changed in various ways, which may depend on the contents of yet other slots. In modern computers, the ones and zeroes are represented by electrical charges in semiconductors, but they could be represented by anything: holes punched in cards, or beads on wires, or eggs in egg cartons. The medium doesn't matter: what's important is the algorithm. All the operations that you do on a computer could be done in exactly the same way by giving a team of people written instructions for moving eggs around in a football field full of egg cartons,though of course it would take longer. (By the way, a football field full of egg cartons has about 1 megabyte of RAM.)

This fact poses problems for computational theories of the mind. If moving electrical charges around in a certain pattern can produce subjective awareness and bring a mind into existence, so can moving around a collection of eggs in the same pattern; and if I knew how many eggs to use and what rules of operation to use in moving them, I could make my egg collection think it was Elizabeth Dole or the Wizard of Oz. I could get the same effects by making chalk marks on a blackboard, or waving semaphore flags, or singing songs, or tap dancing. All these processes can be computationally equivalent, with algorithms that correspond in every detail; but none of them seems like a plausible way of producing a subjective awareness. And since a digital computer is just another way of instantiating an algorithm, it seems impossible for such a device to become conscious. If we ever succeed in creating an artificial intelligence, it's going to have to be something more than just an algorithm machine.

How Is Consciousness Produced?

If consciousness isn't algorithmic, then how is it produced? We don't know.The machineries of consciousness are an almost perfect mystery. Neuro scientists and computer scientists have produced a lot of useful and suggestive models of how the brains of animals process sensory data and judge and discriminate among stimuli. We know that such mechanisms exist in our own brains, and that we need them to perceive the world. But although these perceptual mechanisms are necessary for consciousness, they aren't sufficient, because we can perceive things and respond to them without being aware of them.

The most spectacular example of this is sleepwalking. Many people--as many as 30 percent of all children and 7 percent of adults--sometimes get up and start walking around during the deepest, most unconscious part of sleep. Typically, sleepwalkers open their eyes, sit up in bed with a blank facial expression,pluck aimlessly at the bed clothes, and then rise up and walk. They ignore objects and people nearby, but they usually manage to get around without bumping into things. They may do very complicated and distinctively human things--talk,make phone calls, get into a car and drive off, or even play musical instruments. If you try to wake them up, they struggle violently to get away from you; and if you succeed in awakening them, they're totally confused and have no recollection of what they were doing or how they got there.

The phenomenon of sleepwalking shows that you can get surprisingly complicated and even distinctively human behavior without consciousness. This makes it much harder for us to find out anything about animal awareness. How do we know that animals aren't simply sleepwalking all the time, even when they appear to be awake? Do wolves hunt and horses gallop in their sleep, in the same way that a human somnambulist gets into a car and drives off on the freeway at 65 miles an hour? When the cock crows in the morning, is the farmer the only animal on the farm that wakes up? And if we can do so many things without being conscious, then why did consciousness evolve?

Some people have argued that consciousness confers no adaptive advantage whatever; it's just an incidental side effect of the neural events that produce behavior. But I think that idea can be rejected for Darwinian reasons. If consciousness were a useless epiphenomenon, natural selection would have operated to get rid of it somehow, since we apparently have to pay a high price to maintain it.

The price we pay for consciousness is unconsciousness, of the special kind we call sleep. Most animals don't sleep. Invertebrates and cold-blooded vertebrates usually have daily periods of torpor when they hide and rest, but most of them show little or no correlated change in neural activity. Among vertebrates, true sleep, involving a shift from fast to slow waves in the forebrain, appears to be limited to mammals and birds, though there are hints of it in some reptiles.

Mammalian sleep is so dangerous, complicated, and time-consuming a performance that we feel sure it must have a payoff of some sort, but it's not really clear exactly what it is. On the face of it, it sounds like a bad idea to spend about a third of the day plunged into a limp, helpless trance state that leaves you unable to detect or react to danger. Some argue that sleep serves to conserve energy, which is why we see it only in warm-blooded animals. The trouble with this theory is that mammalian sleep uses almost as much energy as wakeful resting. During eight hours of sleep, a human being saves only about 120 calories. These savings don't seem worth spending a third of your life dead to the world. Another theory holds that sleep is a defense against predators; it's nature's way of telling us to hide during those times of day when we don't need to be active. The main problem with this story is that birds and mammals that are too big to hide still have to flop down and fall asleep every day, right out there on the prairie, exposed to every predator in the world. They do it as little as possible--a horse sleeps only about 3 hours a day, of which only 20 minutes is spent lying down--but they'd be better off if they didn't do it at all. They do it because they have to do it, not to save energy or avoid predators.

Sleep appears to be something imposed upon us, not by our environmental circumstances, but by the needs of the brain itself. Consciousness damages or depletes something in the waking brain, and we can't keep it up indefinitely. If we're forced to stay conscious around the clock, day after day, with rest but no sleep, we soon start manifesting pathological symptoms, beginning with irritability and proceeding through fainting and hallucinations to metabolic collapse and death.

If sleep serves to restore something that is damaged or depleted by things that go on when we are conscious, it seems reasonable to think that animals that have to sleep as we do are conscious when they are awake. It seems significant in this connection that animals that are (probably) never conscious don't sleep,whereas sleep is compulsory for the animals that we know are sometimes conscious (that is, people) and for those nonhuman animals that we suspect for behavioral reasons may have mental lives something like ours. The natural inference is that the waking state in these animals is also something like ours, that it includes mental events and awareness of the world, and that the subjective differences for them between being asleep and being awake parallel our own as closely as the objective (neurological and behavioral) differences do.

The Evidence for Consciousness

Because we can't directly observe the contents of animal minds, the evidence for animal consciousness is necessarily indirect. But it seems at least as persuasive as the indirect evidence that we have for other unobservable phenomena--for example, the Big Bang, or neutrinos, or human evolution. The philosophers and scientists who refuse to acknowledge that dogs feel pain when you kick them seem to me to suffer from the same kind of ingeniously willful ignorance that we see in creationists who reject the notion of evolution because they have never seen a fish turn into a chicken. I am inclined to believe that these philosophers and scientists are not so much concerned about understanding the universe as they are about looking tough-minded and spurning the temptations of anthropomorphism.

To most of us, the temptations of anthropomorphism don't look quite so dangerous as all that. Our close animal relatives, after all, are anthropomorphic in the literal sense of the word, which means "human-shaped."They have organs like ours, placed in the same relative positions. And interestingly enough, they seem to recognize the same correspondences we do.Despite the conspicuous differences in sight, feel, and smell between a humanbody and a dog's, a friendly dog will greet you by licking your face and sniffing your crotch, and a murderously angry dog will go for your throat--just as they would behave in similar moods toward members of their own species. These are sophisticated homology judgments; and they encompass not only anatomy, but behavior as well. Just as we anthropomorphize dogs, horses, and other animals,they cynomorphize and hippomorphize us--and each other--right back in the other direction.

Psychological accounts of these facts often treat them as mistakes: category errors, resulting from what the ethologist Heini Hediger called the"assimilation tendency" in social animals. I suggest that the assimilation tendency isn't a mistake, but an accurate perception of the way things are. In a world inhabited by closely related species, it confers an adaptive advantage. A gazelle that can tell when a lioness is thinking about hunting is less likely to be eaten; a lioness that can tell when a gazelle is thinking about bolting is less likely to go hungry. A man who doesn't notice that a horse is furiously angry, or a horse that can't make that sort of judgment about a human being, is correspondingly less likely to have offspring. Insofar as anthropomorphism recognizes and incorporates these facts about the world, it is not a vice but a survival skill. Indeed, one of the adaptive advantages of consciousness itself may lie precisely in the fact that it facilitates the reciprocal perception of other minds--not just in our own species, but in others as well--by analogy with our own. If this perception is adaptive, as I believe that it is, then perhaps we should stop resisting its incorporation into the world view and vocabulary of science.


Matt Cartmill, PhD (Chicago) is Professor of Biological Anthropology and Anatomy at Duke University's School of Medicine. He is the author of more than a hundred scholarly and popular works on anatomy, evolution, and the philosophy of science. He is a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and has been a Guggenheim Fellow, President of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists, and a Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar. This article is reprinted from the Key Reporter 66.1 (autumn 2000) 6 -9, by permission of its editor, Priscilla S. Taylor, and the author. Copyright © by the Phi Beta Kappa Society. All rights are reserved.


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